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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






NIGEL DWAYNE PARMS, 




RAYMOND J. SOBINA;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00987) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert C. Mitchell 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judges 









 Petitioner Nigel Parms (“Parms”), an inmate in a Pennsylvania state prison, is 
currently serving a five to fifteen year sentence of imprisonment, to be followed by ten 
 2 
years of probation, for his conviction on charges of attempted rape and aggravated 
indecent assault of a five-year-old girl.  He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  The District Court 
found his claim to be without merit and denied his request for relief.  We will affirm. 
I.  Background 
A.  Underlying Facts 
 On the afternoon of July 1, 1997, Parms was drinking beer in the apartment of Mia 
Lewis (“Lewis), who was his brother’s girlfriend.  At some point during that afternoon, a 
five-year-old girl who lived next door to Lewis, came into the apartment looking for 
Lewis’s children, who were her playmates.  While in the apartment, the girl encountered 
Parms, who took her into a bathroom, removed her clothes, spread a lubricant onto her 
vagina, and attempted to have sex with her.  That evening, the girl reported to her mother 
that Parms “did sexes on me.”  After examining her daughter and discovering a greasy 
substance on her vagina, the mother called the police.   
In the early morning hours of July 2, 1997, law enforcement officers arrested 
Parms in Lewis’s apartment after finding him hiding behind a door.  Parms, who is deaf, 
was taken to a police station where a certified interpreter was waiting.  After waiving his 
Miranda rights, Parms provided a statement to police in which he confessed to assaulting 
the girl.  The statement, which was written down by an officer and signed by Parms, is 
extraordinarily graphic, and so we do not quote it here in full:  
I went into the bathroom.  The girl was already in there.  I got the cream and 
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touched her vagina.  Then I put my penis on top of her vagina and I 
ejaculated on her  . . . I gave her some toilet paper to clean up.  I don’t know 
the girl’s name but she is five years old.  This happened this evening at Mia 
Lewis’ apartment in Braddock.  I used the cream that was in a red jar. 
 
(J.A. at 147.)   
 
B.  Suppression Hearing, Trial, & Sentencing 
 On March 30, 1998, Parms appeared in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County to face charges of rape, aggravated indecent assault, and corruption of a minor 
under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3121, 3125, and 6301.  Parms, who had by then 
disavowed his confession, moved to suppress his post-arrest statement on the ground that 
it had been coerced.1
At the one-day bench trial, the prosecution first called the girl, who testified that 
Parms “did sexes on me.”  Specifically, she testified that Parms “put my clothes off,” 
“[t]ouched my privates,” and “put some grease on me.”  (Id. at 131, 123-25.)  She stated 
that he then “pulled his pants down” and “put [his] private on my private,” and that “[i]t 
was hurting” when he did so.  (Id. at 125, 135, 138.)  The prosecution also called 
  Following a hearing at which both Parms and the arresting officer 
testified, the motion was denied.  Parms then elected to waive his right to a jury trial and 
immediately proceed with a bench trial.   
                                                 
1 At the suppression hearing, Parms testified that he initially denied any sexual contact 
with the girl and only decided to admit his involvement after the police “put a lot of 
pressure on me.”  (J.A. at 101.)  Specifically, he asserted that the police “asked me the 
same questions over and over and over again” and that the repeated questioning “made 
me tired and I felt I had to sign [the statement] . . . to make them stop asking me questions 
over and over again.”  (Id. at 107-08.)  We note that the police began questioning Parms 
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Detective Dennis Ostrowski, who testified that after receiving a report of the assault, he 
went to Lewis’s apartment, found Parms hiding behind a door, and placed him under 
arrest.  He explained that although Parms initially denied any wrongdoing, he soon 
confessed to the assault.  Finally, Parms himself testified.  Although he professed his 
innocence of the charges, he acknowledged being in the bathroom with the girl and 
admitted that “something happen[ed] inside the bathroom.”  (Id. at 170.)  He claimed, 
however, that the entire episode had been “an accident.”  (Id. at 106-07.)  Specifically, he 
testified that he had been masturbating in the bathroom with the assistance of some oil 
when the girl unexpectedly walked in:  
And I had my eyes closed and . . . [the girl] walked in and I felt her brush 
me; so I put my hands out and wait -- wait.  Excuse me.  She had her hands 
out and oil got on her, like and I said, what are you doing here?  So I stood 
up to leave and I left; and she went . . . to go to the bathroom.  So I just saw 
her, like, for a minute.  
 
(Id. at 171.)   
Parms was found not guilty of rape, but guilty of attempted rape, aggravated 
indecent assault, and corruption of minors.  At the subsequent sentencing hearing, he was 
sentenced to five to fifteen years’ imprisonment to be followed by ten years’ probation.  
On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal.  
                                                                                                                                                             
at 1:52 a.m. and that Parms signed the confession less than one hour later, at 
approximately 2:40 a.m.  (Id. at 81, 108.)    
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C.  Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 On April 29, 2002, Parms filed a pro se petition for relief under the Pennsylvania 
Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).  Counsel was appointed and entered an 
appearance on Parms’ behalf, but no action was taken on his petition.  On April 29, 2004, 
Parms filed another pro se PCRA petition and requested new counsel, claiming that his 
attorney had abandoned him.  Again, no action took place, and on August 4, 2008, Parms 
filed yet another pro se PCRA petition, and again, nothing happened.  On July 29, 2010, 
after more than eight years of inaction on his state PCRA petitions, Parms filed a pro se 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of Pennsylvania.   
Following the filing of this federal habeas petition, the PCRA court appointed new 
counsel to represent Parms and the Commonwealth filed an answer to his last PCRA 
petition.  Meanwhile, the Commonwealth argued to the District Court that because Parms 
had not exhausted his state court remedies, any review of the habeas petition should “be 
stayed until the state court is able to fully review the merits of [Parms’] PCRA petition.”  
(J.A. at 7.)  On December 6, 2010, the District Court determined that the exhaustion 
requirement should be excused in light of the almost nine-year delay in adjudicating 
Parms’ PCRA petition and the fact that Parms had been jailed for over thirteen years and 
was “rapidly approaching his maximum sentence expiration date.”  (Id.)  Accordingly, it 
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proceeded to reach the merits of Parms’ petition.2
Parms’ habeas petition raised eight separate claims.  Seven of these claims charged 
ineffective assistance on the part of Parms’ trial counsel for his alleged failure to 
investigate, develop, or pursue certain issues during trial.
   
3   The District Court dismissed 
Parms’ habeas petition, describing his ineffective assistance claims as “patently 
frivolous” and declining to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”).  (Id. at 13.)  
Parms timely appealed, and on March 10, 2011, we issued a COA on his claim that trial 
counsel “rendered ineffective assistance by failing to address at trial evidentiary 
inconsistencies regarding: (1) the order in which appellant and the victim entered the 
bathroom; (2) the color of the jar from which appellant took the grease; and (3) the state 
of the victim’s clothing.”  (Id. at 15.)  The application for a COA was denied as to all 
other claims.4
                                                 
2 The Commonwealth has not raised an exhaustion argument before us.  We note that 
Parms’ PCRA petition was denied on September 15, 2011, and a timely appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court remains pending.   
   
3 Parms’ eighth claim related to the “inordinate delay in the state courts in disposing of 
his [PCRA] petitions,” (J.A. at 9), which the District Court addressed by waiving the 
exhaustion requirement. 
4 Although we specifically denied the request for a COA on the remaining claims, Parms 
revisits several of them in his brief on appeal.  (See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 17 [trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to emphasize the short period of time that the girl was 
present in Lewis’s apartment]; id. at 19 [trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate conflicting lab reports on physical evidence of sexual assault].)  While we 
may, in our discretion, sua sponte “expand the scope of the COA beyond the scope 
announced by the motions panel,” Villot v. Varner, 373 F.3d 327, 337 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004), 
it is well-established that we need not consider arguments that are “not within the scope 
of the issue on which we granted a certificate of appealability.”  Miller v. Dragovich, 311 
F.3d 574, 577 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, where both the District Court and the motions panel 
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II.  Discussion5
Because the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we exercise 
plenary review over its dismissal of Parms’ petition.  Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 
203-04 (3d Cir. 2011).  In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we 
apply the familiar two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Under Strickland, a defendant must show: (1) “that 
counsel’s performance was deficient”; and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.”  Id. at 687.  This is a demanding standard.  To demonstrate deficient 
performance, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation “fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”  Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 414 (3d Cir. 
2006).  As for the prejudice prong, the defendant must demonstrate “‘a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.’”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).   
 
We granted a COA on three specific allegations of ineffective assistance, and will 
address each in turn.  None of these allegations has merit. 
A.   
Parms first claims that his trial counsel “rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to address . . . evidentiary inconsistencies regarding . . . the order in which appellant and 
                                                                                                                                                             
have already considered and rejected Parms’ request for a COA on these other claims, we 
decline to sua sponte expand the scope of the COA. 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.   
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the victim entered the bathroom.”  (J.A. at 15.)  This claim is grounded in the cross-
examination of the girl at trial, during which defense counsel pressed her on the details of 
her encounter with Parms, including questioning her closely on whether she or Parms had 
entered the bathroom first.  We excerpt that exchange in full:  
Q:  What was he doing when you went back there to the bathroom? 
A:  He told me to come here and he came in the bathroom and put my own clothes 
off. 
 
Q.  Wait a minute now.  Are you saying that you went to the bathroom first or that 
you walked -- are you saying you walked back there with Nigel?    
 
A:  No.  I went in the bathroom.   
Q:  You walked into the bathroom? 
A:  Yeah. 
Q:  And was Nigel in the bathroom when you walked into the bathroom?  Did you 
see Nigel was in the bathroom when you walked in? 
 
A:  He came in and I came in. 
Q:  So he went in first and then you went in after him; is that right? 
A:  Yeah. 
Q:  Okay.  Did you walk right behind him or was he in the bathroom and then you 
walked in after him?  Do you understand what I’m saying? 
 
A:  Yeah. 
Q:  Were you right behind him or was he already in the bathroom? 
A:  He was already -- he was in there. 
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(Id. at 130-31.)  
Parms characterizes this testimony as “vacillat[ing] about the sequence of events,” 
and he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he “never challenged [the 
girl] on any of the inconsistencies in her testimony.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 17.)  This 
argument fails under both Strickland prongs.  First, trial counsel’s performance was not 
deficient because, as the above transcript clearly shows, he did challenge the girl on 
supposed inconsistencies in her testimony.  Second, even if the failure to further cross-
examine her on the question of who entered the bathroom first amounted to ineffective 
assistance, Parms cannot establish prejudice.  Parms admits to being in the bathroom 
alone with her, and so it is difficult to see how the question of who entered first is even 
relevant.  In any event, given the strength of the evidence against Parms—including his 
signed confession—and the preposterous exculpatory story he presented at trial, there is 
no reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted if defense counsel had 
further pursued this issue on cross-examination. 
B. 
 Parms next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to address the 
inconsistency as to the color of the jar from which he took the lubricant used in the 
assault.  In his confession, Parms stated that he used cream from a red jar.  At trial, 
however, Detective Ostrowski testified that he seized four different creams or lotions 
from Lewis’s apartment and that Parms identified a black jar when these items were 
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shown to him at the police station.  Parms asserts that his trial counsel’s failure to 
emphasize this inconsistency amounted to ineffective assistance because this discrepancy 
“makes the details of his confession unreliable.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 19.)  Parms is wrong.  
The inconsistency as to the color of the jar is entirely immaterial to the charged crime 
given that there is no dispute that Parms used a lubricant on the afternoon in question.  
C.  
The third example of purported ineffective assistance is that trial counsel failed to 
address “evidentiary inconsistencies regarding . . . the state of the victim’s clothing.”  
(J.A. at 15.)  This argument stems from the girl’s testimony, under cross-examination, that 
she “ke[pt her] panties on” during her encounter with Parms.  (Id. at 134.)  On redirect, 
however, the prosecutor revisited the issue: 
Q:  How did he put the grease on your private part if your panties were on? 
A:  He put my panties down to my, to my legs so he put them, put the grease on. 
Q:  Okay.  How far down did he pull your panties?  Do you remember? 
A:  Down here.  (Pointing.) 
Q:  Okay.  Let me see where you are pointing to. 
 THE COURT: Low to mid thigh. 
Q: Okay.  Is that where your panties were when he put his private on your private? 
A:  Yeah. 
(Id. at 137-38.)  Parms argued to the District Court that “counsel was ineffective for 
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fail[ing] to address” this supposedly inconsistent testimony.  (Id. at 26.)  He has 
abandoned this argument on appeal, and we deem it waived.  See Ghana v. Holland, 226 
F.3d at 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000).   
III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Parms’ 
habeas petition.   
 
